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societal examination of the United States’ approach to decentralized
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I.

Introduction

The changing economics of electricity generation in the 1970's,
coupled with the 1973-74 oil crisis, prompted both a legislative and
societal examination of the United States' approach to decentralized
electricity production.1 During the early 1970's, costs associated with
the expansion, maintenance and replacement of generating capacity increased sharply due to inflationary pressures while the growth rate of
electricity demand fell.2 The oil embargo sent fuel costs skyrocketing
and further devastated the electric power industry, 3 as cheap fossil fuel
had molded the development and operating structure of the industry.4
Accordingly, every administration and Congress since 1973 has supported energy conservation to reduce capacity expansion needs and has
encouraged energy supply expansion to reduce foreign oil dependence.
President Carter responded to this energy crisis by proposing a national energy plan. On November 8, 1979 President Carter signed the
National Energy Act (the Act). Three parts of the Act, the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), the National Gas Policy
Act, and the Energy Tax Act of 1978, contain provisions relating to
cogeneration and small power production. 5
* B.A., University of South Florida; M.B.A., J.D., University of Florida. Law
Clerk to Justice James E. Alderman of the Florida Supreme Court. Certified Public
Accountant.
1. Lock, Encouraging Decentralized Generation of Electricity: Implementation
of the New Statutory Scheme, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 705-752, 707 (1980).

2. Id. Cost increases resulted from increased capital costs necessary to finance
plant construction. Additionally, consumption per dollar GNP fell substantially from
1970 to 1971. See 1983 UNITED STATES STATISTICAL ABSTRACT exhibit No. 973.
3. For example, the percent price change increase measured in 1972 constant
dollars of crude oil and bituminous coal for the period 1973-75 was 65.8 percent and
96.4 percent respectively. Id. exhibit No. 974.
4. Lock, supra note 1, at 707.
5. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. ch. 60 (Supp. 1983); 16 U.S.C. ch. 46 (Supp. 1983).
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This legislative encouragement of decentralized electricity production is planned to yield several major societal benefits in the long run:
an increased efficient utilization of energy resources with a commensurate saving of scarce oil and gas reserves,8 an enhanced use and development of renewable energy resources, 7 a greater flexibility and precision in planning utility capacity because of the smaller generating units
utilized in the decentralized structure" and a decrease in business and

financial risks associated with satisfying fluctuating or uncertain future
demands on utility systems due to the faster construction times for
smaller units. 9 The realization of these benefits, however, depends on
the strength of the federal incentives provided in the Act and their effective implementation by the appropriate federal and state agencies.'"
Congress substantially delegated the practical implementation of
PURPA's provisions to the individual states' public commissions
(PUCS), l" as PURPA establishes only broad guidelines necessary to
convey legislative intent.' 2 PURPA requires these commissions to pro-

mulgate rules pursuant to the Federal Energy Commission's (FERC)
regulations.' 3 Under FERC's regulations, the states must establish

rates for utilities' purchases and alternatively establish rates for utili-

6. California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Order No. 91109,011 No. 26
(December 19, 1979) at 13-14. Cogeneration offers efficiencies by permitting the utilization of fuels in a more efficient manner when combined by cogeneration that is possible under conventional technologies. Id.
7. Certain energy resources are renewable such as wind and solar power.
8. California PUC Decision No. 91109, supra note 6. The lead time required for
the construction of a cogeneration facility is estimated to be several years less than the
time required for the construction of a large central station power plant. Thus, customer demand need not be projected so far into the future making demand forecasts
more accurate. Id.
9. Id. Benefits to ratepayors could result because non utility owned cogenerators
have to raise the required capital for construction of the cogeneration facility and these
financing costs would not to be borne by the ratepayors. Further, the cogenerator's
facility is not included in the utility's rate base and the cogenerator is only reimbursed
for actual production, thus, the ratepayor does not have to bear the costs of any unscheduled outages of that facility.
10. See generally, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (Supp. 1983) (discussion of federal incentives for decentralized power generation).
11. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (f)(1) (Supp. 1983). The provision, in part provides: "after any rule is prescribed by the Commission . . . each state regulatory authority shall,
after notice and opportunity for public hearing, implement such rule (or revised rule)
for any electric utility for which it has ratemaking authority." Id.
12. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (a) (Supp. 1983).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (f) (Supp. 1983).
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ties' sales to these co-producers in a manner to effectuate and provide
incentive for the development of decentralized electricity generation.14
However, the establishment and implementation of these rates to encourage this development of decentralized electricity generation has remained the most controversial provision of PURPA.
This article will examine Florida's recent unique implementation
of decentralized power production within the scheme of PURPA. As
background, the institutional barriers that long prevented the development of decentralized power production will be discussed. The scheme
and purpose of PURPA will then be identified with a corresponding
focus on appropriate FERC regulations. With this background, the
final section will examine state implementation of the regulations and
their potential implications with particular emphasis on Florida.

II.

Institutional Barriers to Decentralized Electricity
Production

Electricity, as an energy form, cannot be stored and, therefore,
must be consumed or lost. This physical property is significant for two
reasons. First, the proper distribution of electricity to potential users
requires an efficient transmission system. Second, the inability to store
electricity demands a sufficient generating capacity to satisfy user
needs during those times of the day and year when electrical consumption peaks. Accordingly, the contruction of transmission systems and
productive capacity should necessarily extend beyond current demand.
The necessity of this construction results in extensive plant, property
and equipment investments carrying large fixed costs. Because electricity production is so capital intensive, economies of scale dominate a
electric utility because costs decrease as sales increase. As production
and corresponding sales increase, large fixed costs are distributed over
a greater number of units (i.e., kilowatts) thus decreasing the fixed
costs per unit. 5 This economic behavior is shown in Exhibit 1:

14. 18 C.F.R. § 292.401 (a) (1983). This section provides in part: "each State
regulatory authority shall, after notice and an opportunity for public hearing, commence implementation of Subpart C." Id.
15. L. WEISS & A. STRICKLAND, REGULATION: A CASE APPROACH 3-5 (1976).
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Fixed
Costs
per
Unit

EXHIBIT I

0

Output

These economies of scale and improving technologies allow the
utility industry to reduce per unit costs by increasing capacity and encouraging customer sales.
Because of these scale economies, electricity during the early
1900's quickly proved to be a relatively safe, cheap and attractive
power source, and its use spread to numerous industrial, commercial
and residential application. As utilities continued growing, the utilities'
ability to provide electricity at steadily declining rates made decentralized generation uneconomical. State and local governments began regulating production facilities as public utilities, and years of large-scale
concentrated generation engendered regulatory structures which created economic and insitutional barriers to decentralized electricity production. The states granted monopolies over electricity generation and
distribution to these existing public utitlities based on the theory that
electric power production was a natural monopoly. A natural monopoly
exists when the lowest cost per unit results when only one company
exists in a decreasing cost industry as demonstrated in Exhibit 1. The
one enterprise's fixed costs can be spread across more sales than if two
firms must split the market demand. Thus, the idea of a government
imposed monopoly on power production and distribution was well
founded and in the ratepayors' best interest.
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/2
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The distribution of power remains a natural monopoly because
competition between electric utilities would require duplicate transmission and distribution systems which have sharply decreasing costs. 16
Because of changing economies and technologies, however, the generation of power is no longer a decreasing cost proposition.17 Indeed, in
electric generation some competition would be feasible if all generating
companies could bid for the distribution systems.'" Notwithstanding
this economic fact, the utilities' control over the distribution systems
has perpetuated their monopoly over production even though smaller
facilities could generate at lower costs. Generation cost efficiencies are
irrelevant if the electric power can not be delivered.
The public utilities' transmission and distribution control substantially rendered small producers' sales to parties other than the utility
itself virtually impossible. Because of their monopoly position, public
utilities lacked incentives to purchase electric power or, further, to
purchase the electricity at an appropriate market rate. In addition to
the suppressed purchase price, uncertainty existed as to the treatment
of these small producers as public utilities and as subject to the same
regulation, public scrutiny, controlled profits and administrative burden
as a public utility. Finally, public utilities could also charge discriminatory rates to smaller producers for such services as back-up and maintenance power to discourage their operation.' 9 Thus, the lack of an
open market for electricity sales, coupled with the administrative uncertainty of being regulated as a public utility, discouraged potential
decentralized generation. This inflexible situation existed when the oil
embargo occurred. These barriers, however, prevented a receptive response which highlighted the need for a reorganization of electricity
generation.
III.

Federal Legislative Response-PURPA

Sections 201 and 210 of PURPA contain the primary legislative.
response to these institutional and economic barriers to decentralized
generation.2 0 PURPA establishes broad guidelines 2 ' and requires the
16. See L. WEISS, supra note 15, at 4-5. The logistics of having multiple power
lines throughout the service area by competing power products would be cost prohibitive and aesthetically distasteful.
17. Lock, supra note 1, at 713-14.
18. See L. WEISS, supra note 15, at 5.
19. 45 Fed. Reg. 17,959 (1980).
20. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (Supp. 1983).
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FERC to issue explicit rules for the encouragement of cogeneration
and small power production which state public utility commissions
must implement. 22 Although the FERC regulations permit state discretion, three requirements are clearly set forth by the provisions'
language.
First, a public utility is required to purchase all power offered by
the facility at the utility's full "avoided cost". Thus, qualifying decentralized facilities are conceptually guaranteed a market at an economically fair price.2 3 Avoided cost represents the cost the utility would
have incurred from either generating or purchasing from another supplier, to have that additional increment of power. 24 Second, interconnection with a utility system's electric grid, which guarantees qualifying facilities a limited distribution and transmission system, 25 is
required. This interconnection provision is implicit and critical to the
effective right to sell the electricity because public utilities' monopolies
on distribution systems are overridden. Thus, qualifying facilities can
effectively shop for a competitive price. Finally, if the qualified facility
chooses,26 it must be permitted to purchase electricity from the utility
at non-discriminatory rates. This purchase option enables small
cogenerating facilities to have sufficient backup power for their own
operation if their own systems fail. The successful implementation of
these requirements determine the effectriveness of the Congressional incentive to encourage cogeneration and small power production.
To obtain these federal and corresponding state guarantees, a facility must qualify under the FERC provisions and under the respective
state regulations.2
The federal regulations distinguish between

21. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (a) & (b) (Supp. 1983).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (a) (Supp. 1983).
23. Lock, supra note 1, at 713. Each public utility is required to purchase energy
and capacity power from each qualifying facility at the public utility's avoided cost. 18
C.F.R. § 292.303 and 292.304 (1983).
24. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101 (b)(6) (1983). This provision defines avoided cost as the
"increased costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or both which, but
for the purposes from the qualifying facilities, such utility would generate itself or
purchase from another source." Id.
25. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303 (c) (1983). This section requires electric utilities to
make interconnections with qualifying facilities as is necessary to accomplish purchases
or sales as required by the subpart. Id.
26. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305 (b)(1) (1983). This provision requires public utilities to
furnish qualifying utilities with (i) supplementary power, (ii) back-up power, (iii)
maintenance power and (iv) interruptible power upon request. Id.
27. See 18 C.F.R. § 203 (1983); FLA. ADMIN. CODE 25-17.80 (1983). There are

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/2
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cogenerators and small power producers, although both facilities are
regulated virtually identically. The FERC regulations define a cogenerator as a facility which produces electric energy in addition to some
form of useful energy utilized for industrial, commercial, heating or
cooling purposes.2 8 Aside from certain efficiency standards specified in
the regulations2 9 , the productive capacity of the facilities is not limited.
However, a facility does not qualify as a cogenerator if an electric utility owns more than fifty percent of the equity interest in the plant.3 0
Alternatively, the regulations define a small power producer as an electric generating facility utilitizing as its primary energy source biomass,
waste, renewable resources, geothermal resources or any combination
thereof. The fifty percent ownership restriction is also imposed on small
power producers.3 1
Beyond these qualification criteria, the regulations delegate broad
authority to the states to implement rules in accordance with the intent
of PURPA. The Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC) has
and small
adopted the FERC's qualifying criteria for cogenerators
32
power producers, thus simplifying the qualifying process.

several benefits for qualifying as a cogenerator or small power producer in addition to
those cited in the text. The most important is that such a qualifying facility will be
exempt from federal and state public utility regulation. 18 C.F.R. § 292.601 and
292.602 (1983).
28. 18 C.F.R. § 292.202 (c) (1983).
29. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205 (a) and (b) (1983).
30. 18 C.F.R. § 292.206 (a) and (b). This section reads, in part:
[A] cogeneration or small power production facility shall be considered to
be owned by a person primarily engaged in the generation or sale of electric power, if more than 50 percent of the equity interest in the facility is
held by an electric utility or utilities, or by an electric utility holding company, or companies, or any combination thereof. If a wholly or partially
owned subsidiary of an electric utility or electric utility holding company
has an ownership interest of a facility, the subsidiary's ownership interest
shall be considered as ownership by an electric utility or electric utility
holding company.

Id.
31. 18 C.F.R. § 292.204 (1983).
32. FLA. ADMIN. CODE 25-17.80 (9-2-83). The Florida Public Service Commission adopted FERC's qualifying criteria as their own. The Florida Commission provided, however, that those facilities failing to satisfy the adopted FERC criteria may
still petition the FPSC for qualifying states for the purpose of receiving payments
under the rules. Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 1984
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State Implementation

State public utility commissions (PUCs) are required by section
210 of PURPA to implement the FERC regulations governing the
purchase and sale of electric power by qualifying facilities. The rates
established by the PUCs must act as a price signal to encourage the
development of decentralized generation in accordance with the intent
of the PURPA. The major areas of state discretion are set forth below:
A.

Sales By Qualifying Facilities

Section 210 of the PURPA requires PUCs to establish rates for
electricity sales by qualifying facilities (QFs) to public utilities.3"
PURPA provides that established sales rates "shall not exceed the incremental cost to the electric utility of providing that energy."34 Clarifying PURPA's language, the FERC regulations further state that
electric utilities will not be required to purchase power at rates exceeding the utility's avoided cost. 5 The regulations define avoided cost as
the "incremental costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or both which, but for the purchase from the qualifying facility or
qualifying facilities, such utility would generate itself or purchase from
another source if the purchase from the qualifying facility has not occurred."3 6 Although the regulations provide a number of criteria to
consider in determining avoided costs,"1 the rules leave considerable
33. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f) (Supp. 1983). This section requires that one year following the issuance of FERC's rules, each state commission shall after notice and opportunity for public hearing implement rules pursuant to the mandate of PURPA. Id.
34. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (Supp. 1983). This section also provides that the
purchase rates shall be just and reasonable to customers of the electric utility, in the
public interest, and not discriminate against qualifying facilities. Id.
35. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304 (a)(2) (1983).
36. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101 (b)(6) (1983).
37. 18 C.F.R. § 792.304 (3). These criteria include:
1. Availability of capacity or energy from a qualifying facility during the system daily
and seasonal peak periods, including:
a) Ability of the utility to dispatch the qualifying facility;
b) Expected or demonstrated reliability of the qualifying facility;
c) Contract terms or other legally enforceable coliation, including the duration of the obligation, termination notice requirement and sanctions
for non-compliance;
d) Extent to which scheduled outages of the qualifying facility can be
usefully coordinated with scheduled outages of the utility's facilities;
e) Usefulness of energy and capacity supplied from a qualifying facility

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/2
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discretion to the PUCs concerning avoided costs calculations and QF
purchase rate structure. Essentially, basing payments to QFs on
avoided costs merely provides that payments will be calculated on a
utility's marginal costs. Marginal costs represent the additional costs a
utility incurs if a customer increases power usage at any given time.
Thus, if the electricity a QF supplies to a utility permits that utility to
avoid the costs of purchasing or producing that electricity, the QF receives as payment the utility's avoided cost. As shown in Exhibit 2,
basing utility purchases on marginal costs rates is theoretically sound
because utility purchases reflect the cost consequences to that utility of
supplying that incremental electricity. The shaded area represents the
marginal cost that a utility would incur in producing the additional x
+ 1 unit of electricity. Thus, the utility pays the actual cost that would
have been incurred if the utility had produced or purchased the energy
from another public utility.

Cost
per
Unit

Cost

Marginal

Output
0

X

X+I

EXHIBIT 2

2.

during system emergencies, including its ability to separate its load
from its generation;
f) Individual and aggregate value of energy and capacity from qualifying
facilities on the electric utility's system; and
g) Smaller capacity increments and the shorter lead times available with
additions of capacity from qualifying facilities; and
Relationship of the availability of energy or capacity from the qualifying facility to
the ability of the electric utility to avoid costs, including the deferral of capacity
additions and the reduction of fossil fuel use.

Published by NSUWorks, 1984
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FERC regulations subdivide avoided costs into energy cost and capacity costs.38 Capacity costs represent the costs associated with the
capability to deliver electricity and consist primarily of the facilities
capital costs. 39 Generally, capacity costs can be thought of as the physical facilities necessary to generate electricity. Energy costs, alternatively, are the variable costs associated with the production of electric
energy and represent fuel costs in addition to certain operating and
maintenance expenses.4 0 The Florida Public Service Commissions's
(FPSC) rules utilize the same distinction between capacity and energy
costs in calculating avoided costs for firm as opposed to non-firm power.

B.

Non-Firm Power

Non-firm power or "as available" power, as termed by the FPSC,
is energy produced and sold by a QF with no contractual commitment
as to the quantity, time or reliability of delivery to the purchasing public utility.4 The FPSC requires utilities to purchase as available energy
from all QFs within their service area at the utilities' avoided energy
cost.42 Because as available energy lacks these crucial assurances, Florida's rules require only energy payments and do not provide for capacity payments.4 3 The FPSC explicitly rejected the argument that FERC
regulations require that all QFs delivering "as available energy" be
compensated by a capacity payment.44 The FPSC noted that FERC
does not require that all QFs delivering "as available energy" receive
capacity payments but, rather, only that such delivery may confer capacity related benefits which should then be compensated. 45 Further,
the Commission interpreted FERC's regulations as establishing an ifthen test: "if the evidence demonstrates that a QFs delivery of as-available energy confers capacity related benefits, then compensation for capacity credits should be made."'48 In the rule making proceeding, how-

38.

See supra note 36. This section draws the distinction between electric energy

payments and electric capacity payments. Id.
39.
40.

45 Fed. Reg. 12,216 (1980).
Id.

41.

FLA. ADMIN. CODE

42.
43.

Id.
Id.

§ 25-17.825 (1) (1983).

44. Florida Public Utilities Commission (FPUC), Order No. 12634, Docket No.
820406-EU (Oct. 27, 1983), at 9.
45. id.
46. Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/2
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ever, the FPSC found that persuasive evidence did not exist in the
record to justify such capacity payments.47
This approach reflects a realistic approach to capacity payments.
The rationale underlying capacity payments can be simply stated. As
the utility's service demands expand, guaranteed power is crucial to the
satisfaction of customer needs. If QF production can defer the construction of a generating station by a public utility, then the QF has
replaced the necessity of building additional capacity. Consequently,
the QF should receive payments for this deferred capacity. If, however,
power deliveries fluctuate between periods, then utilities can not depend
on these deliveries during peak periods and need to construct the necessary capacity. Public utilities must expand capacity to meet these demands which the QFs fluctuating delivery could not satisfy with sufficient certainty. In this situation, no capacity needs have been avoided,
thus rendering capacity payments improper.
Many PUCs, including Florida's, apply the concept of time-of-use
rates to the purchase of "as available power." Under this methodology,
rates reflect the value of QF generation to the utility system at different times. 48 The demand for power varies both with the time of day
and the season of the year as shown in Exhibit 3:
D
E
M
A
N
D
Summer

Autumn

Winter

Fall

D
E
M
A
N
D

Morning

Midday

Evening

EXHIBIT 3

47.

Id. The FPSC found that record indicated that Florida utilities included QF

capacity in their expansion plans but this was an inadequate showing of what amount
of this power would be sold on a firm basis. Thus, capacity payments were not supported by the record. Id.
48. Lock & Kuiken, Cogeneration and Small Power Production:State Implementation Of Section 210 Of PURPA, 3 SOLAR L. REP. at 673 (1981).
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Utility generating equipment can be divided into three categories:
baseload, intermediate, and peaking. Baseload equipment supplies that
portion of the load which remains constant, regardless of the time or
season. Baseload generating units are large and substantial warm up
periods. Naturally, peaking units are small and have the ability to be
placed on line quickly to satisfy sharp demand peaks. Intermediate
generating units can be placed on line more quickly than baseload units
and may be utilizied a significant portion of the time as a spinning
reserve. Generally, baseload generating capacity requires the highest
capital costs followed respectively by intermediate and peaking units.
Because peaking and intermediate units are utilized only a portion of
the time, the actual capacity recovered from the ratepayors is often in
the reverse order. Thus, when the capital cost is weighted by the time
49
that the capacity is utilized, peaking units are the most expensive.
In addition to capacity costs, fuel costs are generally higher when
intermediate and peaking equipment are usually less efficient than
baseload equipment. Also, baseload units usually consume less expensive fuels than intermediate and peaking units. Thus, QFs will receive
the highest purchase rates for delivering power during peak demand
periods when their power can reduce the utility's need to run the more
costly units. 5 0 The relationship between these costs is demonstrated in
Exhibit 4:
""-Intermediate

Capital Cost
Peaking
Capital Cost

Cost
per
Unit

Baseload Capital
Cost
Peaking Fuel
Cost

0

Intermediate
Fuel Cost
Baseload Fuel
Cost
Time Utilized

EXHIBIT 4

49. Eisenstadt, PURPA and PV Systems, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 1061-82 (1981).
50. Id.
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In Florida, if the utilities do not negotiate a contractual rate with
a QF in their service area, they must purchase "as available energy" at
rates established in their standard contract tariff.51 The standard tariff
rates will be predetermined by the FPSC. Additionally, these tariff
rates will be based on either the utility's actual hourly incremental
costs for hours during which no economy energy transactions occur, the
actual incremental costs after economy energy purchases, or the actual
incremental costs before economy energy sales. Thus, Florida's tariff
rates reflect time of day usage.52 Alternatively, a utility may negotiate
a separate contract rate with any QF either inside or outside its service
area. In any case, as stated above, a utility is not required to pay for
capacity costs. 53
C.

Firm Power

The FPSC defines firm power as energy and capacity produced
and sold by a QF pursuant to a contract and subject to quantity, time,
and reliability of delivery contractual provisions.54 The FPSC has taken
a unique approach in calculating firm power payments and has asserted
that in evaluating firm energy and capacity payments, whether pursuant to promulgated tariffs or negotiated contracts, rates must be based
on deferrable capacity related costs viewed on a statewide perspective.
To implement this statewide approach, the FPSC chose a "uniform statewide price for QF capacity based on the next planned uncertified unit wherever the need existed in the state."5 5 This planned uncertified power plant is termed the "statewide avoided unit." Under the
standard offer, the price for capacity payments is based on the value of
deferring construction of the statewide avoided unit for a period of
time. Thus, if a QF provides firm power to a public utility, the utility
can incorporate and utilize the contracted for electricity sales in its expansion plans. Given a sufficient level of firm power available, utilities
can defer the construction of additional plants. The FPSC has adopted
an approach of treating Florida as one service area. Statewide tariff
rates are based on deferring the construction of this unit. Essentially,
51.

See supra note 41.

52.
53.

FLA. ADMIN. CODE

25-17.825 (2) (1983).
Id. 25-17.825 (1)(b) (1983).

54. Id. 25-17.83 (1) (1983).
55. Id. 25-17.83 (1983); Docket No. 820406-EU, Order No. 12634, (Oct. 27,
1983) at 14.
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the value of deferral is a calculation of the value of deferring the revenue requirements associated with the new generating plant by a time
period, then comparing the difference in annual revenue requirements
should the revenue requirements stream began in year x as compared
to beginning in the year x + I. 6 In order to calculate the deferral
value, one must identify the deferred plant and must ascertain the anticipated in-service date along with the plant's projected costs.57 The
FPSC has designated a jointly owned peninsular Florida base load coal
plant consisting of two 700 mega-watt units with an in-service date of
April 1, 1992 as the statewide avoided unit. 58 A utility needs to know
that QF capacity will not supplement an avoided unit until that unit's
otherwise anticipated in-service date. Projected capacity savings, therefore, must be discounted back to present value. The FPSC believes
these rules link the purchase price of QF capacity to the value of other
supply side alternatives available to a utility necessary to its service
obligation. This linkage ensures that cogeneration and small power production will remain a cost effective conservation measure. Thus, the
value of QF capacity is linked to the statewide unit from both a timing
and a cost perspective.
Although the actual capacity payment calculation is complicated,
the Florida approach is very unique. First, the FPSC has included no
provision for the payment of existing capacity credits but rather payments are based on deferring future capacity construction. Some states
do include such a capacity payment. Under the FPSC's rules, however,
capacity payments reflect the avoidance of future potential costs to the
ratepayors. Second, the rules attempt to funnel cogeneration capacity
to the utilities with the greatest need. The FPSC considered setting
capacity prices on an individual utility basis. Under this approach, each
utility would set a capacity price based on the value of deferring its
next planned uncertified generating units in its service area. Because
the price would vary with each utility under this methodology utilities
with the earliest in-service date would probably offer the best price and
QFs would pursue negotiations with this utility out of economic self
interest. This approach would generate differing price and require
wheeling if the utility with the greatest need was to receive the needed
additional capacity. The approach adopted by the FPSC establishes a

56.
57.

Id. at 14-16.
Id. at 16.

58. Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC), Order No. 13247, Docket No.
830377-EU (May 1, 1984) at 4.
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/2
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uniform statewide price. Utilities are required to purchase all QF capacity in their service area. The FPSC explicitly stated, however, that
it expects a utility to promptly sell unneeded QF capacity in its service
area to the utility with the statewide avoided unit in its service area.
Further, the Commission expects these transactions to occur at cost
thus the utility without the need for QF capacity will incur no costs
related to the initial purchase and these costs will not be passed on to
their ratepayors. This statewide approach promotes uniformity and
fairness in the development of decentralized generation. The Commission believed this approach protects the interests of all Florida
ratepayors on an equal basis. This approach also recognizes that decentralized generation confers capacity related benefits on ratepayors only
if QFs supply the needed capacity at a cost effective price. That is,
capacity payments must be based on a forward looking approach, and
decentralized generation should not be an end into itself, but should
lead instead to an efficient allocation of resources. Finally, these rules
are specifically geared at paying avoided costs and not the additional
costs of providing cogeneration and small power production. 59
The energy payments for firm power are also linked to the statewide avoided unit. Section 25-17.83(6) of the Florida Administrative
Code provides that commencing with the avoided unit's anticipated inservice date, QFs receive "the lesser of the as available energy costs of
the utility planning the avoided unit or the energy cost associated with
the unit itself." 0 This rule requires the payment of "the lesser" because where the planning utility's incremental fuel costs are less than
the avoided unit's fuel costs, it is cost effective to base fuel costs on
existing plants' marginal costs.
Florida's growth blurs the FPSC's line between payments for energy and payments for capacity. For example, if a utility is adding
large amounts of baseload capacity to satisfy growing demands then
defining energy costs as the marginal operating costs may underestimate actual energy costs. Under this scenerio, capacity is added to
avoid the need to use peaking units. Capacity is added because the
lower operating costs of base load units more than compensates for
high capital costs. Thus, capital costs are incurred to provide energy,
not capacity. This conclusion is based on the fact that capital can be
substituted for fuel costs in the long run. Accordingly, in this situation
some capacity costs are really energy costs, and some avoided capacity
59. Id. at 14.
60. FLA. ADMIN.
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costs are in reality avoided energy costs.
The statewide approach for both capacity and energy payments is
beneficial to the State of Florida and its ratepayors for several purposes. First, the capacity related benefit of decentralized generation reflects the avoidance or deferral of additional generating capacity construction. Thus, capacity payments reflect the avoidance of future
potential costs to ratepayors. This approach is also consistent with the
FPSC's approach of determining additional capacity need on a statewide basis. This consistency in policy decisions reflects and promotes a
uniform reaction to Commission decisions; therefore, policy disputes
are focused. Further, this approach permits Florida and its ratepayors
to maximize the benefit from QF capacity by channeling geographically dispersed QF capacity to the utility with the most urgent capacity
need.6 Thus, one utility's generation expansion plans may be significantly altered by the aggregate impact of all firm QF capacity as opposed to a potentially slight impact on the generation expansion plans
of many utilities by varying amounts of firm QF capacity scattered
throughout their separate service areas.6 2
D.

Purchases by QFs

Section 210(1) of PURPA requires that retail rates charges to
QFs for power purchases be just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory
against QFs.63 The FERC interprets the nondiscrimination provision as
requiring that QFs be charged the same retail rate as another customer
of power and not as a co-producer of electricity.64 Only if a utility can
demonstrate on the basis of adequate data that a QF's service costs are
different from other customers, would a different rate be justified and
allowed.6 5 This provision is particularly critical to many potential industrial cogenerators which feared that their purchase rates would increase if they competed with the utility in electricity generation.
This provision is an essential part of the PURPA scheme if the
legislative encouragement of decentralized generation is to be effective.
Further, this article asserts that these rates should be adjusted to reflect the load these cogenerators actually place on the system. For ex-

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See supra note 55, at 18.
Id.
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (c) (Supp. 1983).
18 C.F.R. § 292.305 (a) (1983).
18 C.F.R. § 292.305 (b) (1983).
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ample, suppose that existing customer rates are based on marginal
costs. The issue becomes whether a QF should purchase electricity on a
marginal cost as any other customer. The proposed answer is not that it
is necessarily in the ratepayor's interest for the QF to purchase electricity based on marginal cost. Traditionally, a class of customer's load
factors permit PUCs to estimate what demands this group will place on
the utility system. On the basis of this predicted behavior, costs are
allocated and charged in a manner to reflect this behavior. This is why
different customer classes exist for rate making purposes. Accordingly,
a more equitable rate would utilize a rate structure that explicitly
tracks utility costs for sales made to QFs rather than a broad structure
that applies to all customers. This approach is consistent with the
PURPA scheme because unjustifiable discrimination is not allowed and
should be guarded against.
Moreover, the rates at which QFs can purchase power are crucial
to the development of decentralized generation. For example, if average
costs are higher than marginal costs at a given generation point, then it
may be reasonable to base all purchase rates on average costs, or at
least charge the QF a rate higher than marginal costs as shown in Exhibit 5. This approach would provide additional payments from QFs'
power purchases so that QFs would contribute revenues to meet the
utility's fixed costs as other ratepayors. This approach, however, may
simply encourage QFs to install extra capacity and forego purchasing
any electricity from the utility.
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The proposed Florida cogeneration guidelines in section 25-17.84
of the Florida Administrative Code do not appear to capture the above
underlying economic consequences. However, the rate setting procedure
may compensate for any lack of foresight in these rules or lack of specific guidelines.
V.

A.

Effective Implementation of Florida's Approach - A
Realistic Analysis

Wheeling

Section 210 of PURPA does not provide QFs with an automatic
right to wheel its electricity to other utilities outside the adjacent utility's service area. Further, QFs are not granted the statutory right to
request a FERC wheeling order under sections 211 and 212 of the Federal Power Act because such wheeling requests are limited to facilities
defined as public utilities, and the thrust of PURPA is not to define
cogenerators as utilities.6 6 The FERC unofficially has stated that the
agency will not move on the issue of forced wheeling for cogenerators.
The reason stated for this policy is that no party has demonstrated that
forced wheeling will boost the efficiency of electricity generation or distribution.6" The FERC regulations, constrained by the FERC's authority to order wheeling, do enable a QF to wheel with the consent of the
adjacent utility and any other intervening utility.6 8 If every utility cooperated in wheeling, QFs could shop around for the most favorable
rate throughout the utility grid.
A strong economic incentive to wheel may exist between a QF and
an adjacent utility where the adjacent utility does not generate its own
power, but rather purchases its power in bulk from another utility. The

66.

16 U.S.C. § 824 j and k (Supp. 1983).

67. FERC Will Not Move on Issue of Forced Wheeling, not Even for Cogenerators, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Aug. 2, 1982, at 1.
68. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(d) (1983). This section, in relevant part, provides:
If a qualifying facility agrees, an electric utility which would otherwise be
obligated to purchase energy or capacity from such qualifying facility may
transmit the energy or capacity to any other electric utility. Any electric
utility to which such energy or capacity is transmitted shall purchase such
energy or capacity under this subpart as if the qualifying facility were
supplying energy or capacity directly to such electric utility.
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best example of this situation is an electricity cooperative. Assume the
adjacent utility buys electricity at rates based on the nonadjacent utility's average embedded cost, but that this rate is lower than the
nonadjacent utility's avoided cost. Further assume that the nonadjacent
utility's embedded cost rate and avoided cost rate are five and ten cents
per kilowatt hour respectively. Assume also that the QF sold its electricity to the adjacent utility for purchases from the nonadjacent facility (i.e., five cents per kilowatt hour). That is, the adjacent utility's
purchase price from the nonadjacent utility represents the full avoided
costs. Under this scenario, an obvious incentive exists for the QF to
wheel to the nonadjacent utility rather than sell to the adjacent utility.
Selling QF power to the nonadjacent utility would provide ten cents per
kilowatt hour payment to the cogenerator as opposed to a five cents per
kilowatt hour if sold to the adjacent utility. The adjacent utility benefits because the facility can continue to purchase power from a stable
source. Practically, however, the QFs' incentive may be reduced by the
requirement that the transmitting utility be reimbursed for the line
losses or by the burden of negotiation costs.
Some PUCs have-noted the importance of wheeling to QF development, but few have made specific substantive rulings. The lack of PUC
involvement in this area may be based on its position that states lack
direct authority to order wheeling because of federal pre-emption. Further, a reasonable position might be that efforts by PUCs to assert direct jurisdiction over wheeling may violate the pre-emption doctrine
even if the transaction takes place within the state concerned. This position is based on cases where courts have viewed utility transmission
lines, which are interconnected with the grids of other states, as being
essentially in interstate commerce and subject to the Federal Power
Act. Extending this reasoning then, even if a QF made direct sales to
non-utility end users, the utilization of a utility's transmission lines
would be subject to federal jurisdiction. This conclusion would be the
same regardless of whether the sale itself were a wholesale sale, subject
to FERC jurisdiction, or a retail sale, usually subject to PUC jurisdiction. This position is not universal, however, and the matter has not
been directly tested in the courts.6 9
The FPSC's rules do not follow this line of analysis, but do follow
the minority view. Section 25-17.835(1) of the Florida Administrative
Code requires the utility in whose service area the QF is located, and

69.

Lock & Kuiker, supra note 48, at 679.
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any other intervening utility, to wheel the QFs' electricity to any
purchasing utility.70 The QF, however, must pay for all costs associated
with such wheeling including wheeling charges, line losses and inadvertent energy flows. 71 The wheeling utility may petition the FPSC to
waive this wheeling requirement if the utility's ability to provide adequate service to its other customers will be impaired or will unduly
burden the utility. 72 As aforementioned, the commission believed that
the maximum benefit of decentralized generation would be achieved by
establishing a statewide wholesale market for QF power. This wheeling
requirement again remains consistent with the statewide approach in
establishing purchase rates for firm energy and capacity. With respect
to firm energy and capacity, the FPSC has attempted to establish a
regulatory scheme where QFs would not be concerned with the wheeling because of the established statewide price and where the QF would
merely contract with the utility in whose service area it is located. This
statewide price would eliminate the need for a QF to shop for the highest price because the highest price would be predetermined. The utility
planning the statewide unit would then purchase QF capacity from all
other utilities 73 and thus satisfy its capacity needs. Under this regulatory plan, the contractual process is streamlined and the utility whose
capacity needs have been aleviated receives the necessary electricity.
Alternatively, the FPSC provided for QFs to deal directly with the
utility planning the statewide unit or to market its electrical power to
other utilities.7 4 Thus, under the FPSC's integrated plan, QFs can negotiate contracts throughout the state for the purchases of their power
and are guaranteed a means of delivery. This wheeling requirement
should encourage decentralized generation because QFs can effectively
shop around for the "best deal" in the state, if one exists.
The financial incentives of shopping around depend significantly on
the wheeling charges imposed by the transmitting facility. The FPSC

70. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-17.835 (1983). This section provides in part:
"Where such sakes are made the utility in whose service territory the qualifying facility
is located and any other intervening utility shall make arrangements to wheel electricity produced by the qualifying facility to the purchasing utility." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-17.835, Docket No. 820406-EU, Order No. 12634,
(Oct. 27, 1983), at 20.
74. Id. at 21. The FPSC believed that "since the ratepayors will experience no
direct benefit as a result of wheeling of power . . . the wheeling utility absorb no costs
of the transaction." Id.
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has ruled that QFs be responsible for all wheeling expenses. The FPSC
adopted this rule based on the equitable considerations of the transmitting utilities' ratepayors in that the wheeling utility's ratepayors will
receive no direct benefit as a result of wheeling QF power; accordingly,
the wheeling utility should absorb no costs of the transaction. 75 The
actual detrimental effect of this rule to cogeneration development varies if the electricity is wheeled from a QF to a utility in which the
statewide avoided unit is located. If the purchasing utility is directly
interconnected with the utility planning the statewide avoided unit and
has transmission line capability, one could reasonably assert that no
wheeling charges should be imposed. If, however, the purchasing utility
is not directly interconnected, but must wheel the QF's electricity
through a third utility whose transmission capability is not available,
then affected utilities should impose wheeling charges on the QF or
refuse such wheeling. Further, if the purchasing utility is not directly
interconnected, and must wheel the electricity through a third utility
with sufficient line capacity, the wheeling utility should impose wheeling charges to recover any resulting costs. The FPSC has adopted the
above approach, but expressed doubt as to whether the commission or
the FERC has the authority to establish such wheeling rates. The impact of this intrastate approach of decentralized generation depends on
the ability of the FPSC to receive a favorable legal opinion from the
FERC and possibly ultimately from the courts.
B.

Environmental Impact

In addition to the uncertainty surrounding the FPSC's authority to
order wheeling, environmental issues dampen the proposed advantages
of a legislative encouragement of decentralized generation. The use of
excess waste heat or certain fuels may result in severe environmental
damage which would not be permitted by a public utility. Electric utilities are subject to the Florida Electrical Energy Power Plant Siting Act
(the "Siting Act") in addition to various Federal environmental requirements. Although inadequate in their operation,7 6 these statutory
requirements provide a framework for evaluating the environmental

75.

FLA. STAT.

§ 403.501-519 (1983).

76. See Note, Florida Electrical Energy Power Plant Siting Act: Perpetuating
Power Industry Supremacy in the Certification Process, U. FLA. L. REV. (1984); Note, Nuclear Power Plant Siting: Additional Reductions in State Authority,

28 U.

FLA.

L.

REV.

439 (1979).
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impact of planned power plants. Moreover, the Siting Act does not
even apply to facilities which produce under 50 megawatts which
would include many QFs.11 The same framework for analyzing large
power plant production would not apply to cogeneration facilities although the environmental concerns would be identical.
The development of environmental standards for QFs would be equitable to all parties included. First, the economic feasibility of QF production should be evaluated in light of all relevant costs including environmental concerns. Second, a balance must be struck between the
encouragement of decentralized generation and the protection of the
natural resources. Currently, the balance weighs heavily in favor of decentralized generation. Third, rate payors should not be required to pay
avoided costs which include costs of complying with environmental regulations to QFs which do have to comply with the identical regulations.
If ratepayors must pay full avoided costs, they should receive the same
environmental protection. Finally, such protections extend the intent of
the Siting Act. Therefore, current cogeneration and small power production provisions at both the state and federal levels should be modified to effectively deal with the environmental implications of decentralized generation.
C.

Implications of Simultaneous Sales and Purchases

The FERC rules permit a QF simultaneously to sell its entire output to a utility at avoided cost and to buy energy from the utility at
retail rates.7 8 The consequences of this approach are demonstrated in
Exhibit 6. Average costs are less than marginal costs. Existing customer and QF purchase rates are based on average costs such as shown
at point x. QFs can sell their output at the higher marginal cost to the
utilities which are required to purchase at this avoided cost. Under this
scenerio, a QF will receive higher payments for electricity sold to the
utility (marginal costs) than a QF must pay for electricity purchases
(average cost). Thus, the QF may in fact receive a net payment from
the utility even though all its output may be used on site.

77. FLA. STAT. § 403.503(7) (1983). This section provides in part: "Electric
power plant means . . . except that this term does not include any steam or solar elecId.
trical generating facility of less than 50 megawatts in capacity.
78. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305 (1983).
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EXHIBIT 6

This approach represents a substantial policy decision and can be

justified on several grounds. First, one could assert that cogenerators
should not be discriminated against in the purchase of electricity simply because they are co-producers of electricity. In return for being
granted a state potential monopoly and guaranteed a specific rate of
return on investments, utilities owe an obligation to all customers, including QFs. Additionally, it is arguable that ratepayors are not paying
more for the electricity than if the utility produced the power itself
because payments to QFs are based on the utility's avoided costs. Finally, this approach provides an additional incentive to the development
of decentralized generation which could benefit all parties in the long
run.
Notwithstanding the above rationale, there is an inherent injustice
in permitting QFs to benefit from simultaneous purchases and sales.
under certain instances. For example, consider an industrial plant
which produces excessive waste heat. The plant had previously obtained
the requisite power from the local public utility. Because of the
cogeneration rules, the industrial plant installs a power production
mechanism which produces electricity far in excess of. the plant's needs.
Moreover, the plant chooses this oversize capacity to take advantage of
the simultaneous purchase and sale requirements and even purchases
an inefficient boiler to reduce production costs. Under this scenerio, the
plant can purchase the public utility's power at the lower average cost,
yet force the utility to purchase the plant's power at the higher avoided
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
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cost. The plant benefits from receiving payments far in excess of their
power production costs. It is doubtful whether the ratepayors benefit
because the utility must purchase the electricity at a higher price, not
for just the net amount, i.e., what the plant produced over what the
plant purchased from the utility, but for the entire amount produced.
That is, if the plant produced eighty megawatts, but only used two
megawatts, the utility would have to purchase the full eighty megawatts and not the more logical seventy-eight megawatts. Moreover, all
parties suffer if the plant's production facilities cause more pollution
than if the utility produced the incremental amount.
The FPSC has adopted both a simultaneous buy/sell approach
and a net billing approach under the current rules; however, simultaneous buy/sell arrangements must be available to QFs if they choose."
Given the above scenario, more flexibility should be built into the federal and state rules to permit only a net billing approach in the appropriate situation.

VI.

Conclusion

Decentralized generation has many potential benefits. The realization of these benefits, however, depends on an effective implementation
of the federal provision by the state PUCs. Additionally, the effectiveness of the rates imposed depend on the specific economic conditions
for both the utility and the QF. Notwithstanding this limitation, Florida has adopted a unique and well-reasoned approach to implement
these rules by balancing the competing interests of QF development
and existing ratepayors. Ratepayors theoretically bear no additional
costs under the FPSC's rules yet are still able to reap the benefits of a
decentralized generation approach. Environmental issues have yet to be
adequately addressed. However, this balancing should result in a wellplanned and cost effective development of decentralized generation in
this state.

79. FLA. ADMIN.
(Sept. 2, 1983).
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